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This examination of the division of the sciences offered by Thomas Aquinas and Francis
Bacon compares the ontological approach to the sciences proposed by Aquinas and the mod-
ern pragmatic scientific theory ofBacon. The author weighs a proposed elimination ofmeta-
physicsfrom the thinking ofBacon and its implicationsfor modem scientific thought, conclud-
ing finally that metaphysics is extremely important as the governing agent of the sciences.
Before Francis Bacon's time, a student
might have questioned three different teach-
ers about the sciences. The first might have
taught about the physics or natural science
of the world. Another might have guided
the student to an understanding of the math-
ematics locked up inside the mind. While
the third might have asked the student to
consider the reality of the things closer to
God, those divine things. These three divi-
sions are how Saint Thomas Aquinas viewed
the sciences.
Since Bacon's time, a student might
question only one. A natural scientist might
teach a modern version of science that joins
physics and mathematics. And that same
professor might also try to convince the stu-
dent that metaphysicians are rightly given
offices in the back of the humanities depart-
ment to contemplate their alternative views
of reality. For modern natural scientists,
though, the reality of the physical world is
deducible, verifiable, and pliable through the
use of physico-mathematics. Thus, reality
does not exist until it is empirically tested,
poked, or prodded. There are those, how-
ever, who believe that the reality of the physi-
cal world can be perceived without the aid
of measurements. Instead, it is beheld
ontologically. In this study, then, I seek to
comprehend modem natural science's rejec-
tion ofAquinas' division of the sciences and
its subsequent adherence to the one presented
by Bacon.
Aquinas' division of the sciences
Before Aquinas' division of the sciences
can be understood, his concept of the hu-
man intellect must first be grasped. For
Aquinas, the human intellect performs two
basic operations. Firstly, one apprehends
what a thing is, that is, its essence or nature
—
what makes a rabbit a rabbit. Secondly, one
uses the apprehension of essences to make
judgments. Aquinas defines judgment as the
ability to compose or divide what is grasped
by simple apprehension. 1 Aquinas says that
the intellect abstracts what it is that effects
simple apprehensions. 2 Abstraction, then, is
how he describes what scientists do in their
various fields of study. So, in looking at
nature, scientists can abstract in one of two
ways: they can either abstract form from
sensible matter, or abstract the universal
from the particular. 3 In abstracting form
from matter, one might look at a picture of a
triangle and then try to abstract from the pic-
ture the triangle's form. What is it that lets
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the mind distinguish what a triangle is? One
might then say that a triangle's form con-
sists of three straight lines that are connected
in such a way as to form three angles with a
sum of internal measurement equaling 180
degrees. In abstracting the universal from
the particular, one might use, for example,
the dissection of a frog, m
Through such a dissection
one seeks to understand
how the particular frog
under examination digests
food or engages in repro-
duction. After gaining in-
formation from the par-
ticular frog, one would try
to make true universal
statements concerning all
frogs.
Those who study
metaphysics, though,
make abstractions using
more than simple appre- B
hension, because they are concerned with ex-
istence, not just with essence. Whereas
simple apprehension is concerned with es-
sence, judgment deals with existence.
Aquinas, therefore, calls metaphysical ab-
straction by the term separation* Separa-
tion, then, is distinct because it abstracts us-
ing negative judgment rather than simple
apprehension. The judgment is negative be-
cause it denies that being is locked up in
matter. Hence, metaphysics maintains an
existential character that the other two divi-
sions of science do not.
According to Aquinas, the sciences are
first divided into the speculative and the prac-
tical. Speculative science strives to discover
truth, while practical science uses truth to
perform activity. Speculative science is
subdivided according to its different objects
of speculation; thus, the sciences are further
divided into three branches: natural philoso-
phy, mathematics, and metaphysics. The first
branch to be considered is natural philoso-
phy—or physics, or natural science. Aquinas
says the things studied by this branch of sci-
ence depend upon matter for their being, as
well as for their being understood. 5 There-
fore, this branch concerns itself with what
is of matter and in motion. Aquinas under-
stands universals in natural philosophy to be
abstracted from particulars.6
Bacon immediately divides his doctrine
of natural philosophy into the specula-
tive or theoretical, and the practical.
The speculative side searches after
causes, while the practicalfocuses on
the production of effects. As Bacon
puts it, "the one enter[s] into the bowels
of nature, and the otherform[s] her
upon the anvil/'
As to the nature of these universals, they
may be abstracted in two different ways:
They may be abstracted
in themselves; and then they are thought
of without motion and determinate
matter. This happens to them only by
reason of the being they have in the
intellect. 7
Alternatively, they
can be viewed in relation to the things of
which they are the natures; and these
things exist with matter and motion.
Thus they are principles by which we
know these things, for everything is
known through its form. 8
In other words, the mind abstracts the form
of a rabbit, for example, after having seen
one in the physical world. And after the
rabbit's form is determined, one is able to
compare it to knowledge of other forms.
Concerning mathematics, Aquinas says
that it deals with what does not require mat-
ter for its being, but does require matter for
its being understood. 4 Thus, mathematics is
the abstraction of form from matter. This
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matter is not sensible matter, but intelligible
matter. Aquinas says that
a form can he abstracted from matter if
the essential nature of the form does not
depend on that particular kind of matter;
hut the intellect cannot abstract form
from the kind of matter upon which the
form depends according to its essential
nature."'
This, in other words, is the type of abstrac-
tion mentioned earlier in the triangle ex-
ample. So, Aquinas argues, accidents are
related to their substance as form is related
to matter; and because it is the nature of ac-
cidents to depend on their substances, forms
of this kind rely on substance." Quantity,
then, is in substance, before the sensible
qualities (quality, passivities, and action) are
attached to it. Therefore, Aquinas says, ac-
cidents are abstracted, and what is left is the
substance, intelligible only to the intellect. 12
Substance, then, because it is beyond the
human senses to comprehend, is abstracted
by mathematics.
There is another division of science that
Aquinas mentions within his discussion of
mathematics. It falls somewhere between
two branches formed by natural science and
mathematics. It falls be- m
tween the two divisions,
because physical reality
functions in their mate-
rial structure, while
mathematics functions in
their formal structure.
Aquinas says this branch
of science, including as-
tronomy and music,
makes mathematical con-
clusions to prove natural
things. 1 -'
Consider Aquinas' third branch of sci-
ence: metaphysics—or divine science or the-
ology. Metaphysics is the abstraction of
things without matter and without motion.
These divine things are to be studied in two
ways: "first, insofar as they are common prin-
ciples of all things, and second insofar as they
are beings in their own right." 14 Aquinas says
these common principles can be realized,
only as they reveal themselves. 15 The sec-
ond way is to learn not from the effects of
these principles, but from what the principles
reveal about themselves. The first of these
methods describes the metaphysics of the
philosophers, while the second is the theol-
ogy of the Sacred Scriptures. The metaphys-
ics of the philosophers that Aquinas describes
is based upon the Aristotelian concept of pri-
mary philosophy or theological science. (The
term "metaphysics" was given later, by the
Peripatetic tradition. 16 ) Aristotle's metaphys-
ics considers things from the viewpoint of
their being, 17 which is the unchangeable, in
contrast with the ever-changing world around
us. Hence, Aquinas says metaphysics is the
study of that which is without matter or mo-
tion. The theology of the Sacred Scriptures,
however, deals with the Christian concept of
God. In particular it is concerned with God's
relationship to Creation through the divine
revelation and through the Son, Jesus Christ.
Bacon's division ofthe sciences
For Bacon, the structure of the sciences
is analogous to a pyramid. The base is natu-
ral philosophy; just above the base is phys-
Concerning mathematics, Aquinas says
that it deals with what does not require
matterfor its being, but does require
matterfor its being understood. Thus,
mathematics is the abstraction ofform
from matter.
ics; just underneath the vertex is metaphys-
ics; and, finally, the vertex is the summary
law of nature that God used to create the
universe. 32 Bacon expects no human inquiry
will ever reach the knowledge represented
by the vertex.
Beginning at the base of the pyramid,
Bacon's analysis of natural philosophy di-
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vides it into the speculative or theoretical,
and the practical. The speculative side
searches after causes, while the practical
focuses on the production of effects. As
Bacon puts it,
[t]he one enterfs] into the bowels of
nature, and the other form[s] her upon
the anvil. 18
Bacon argues one should always treat specu-
lation as distinct from operation. ly
The speculative branch of natural philoso-
phy is further divided into physics and meta-
physics. Bacon then divides physics into three
categories: the physics of the principle of
things, the physics of the structure of the uni-
verse, and the physics of "all the possible va-
F or Bacon, the structure of the
sciences is analogous to a pyramid:
the base is natural philosophy; just
above the base is physics; just un-
derneath the vertex is metaphysics;
and, finally, the vertex is the sum-
mary law of nature that God used to
create the universe.
rieties and the lesser collections of things." 2"
This third category is comprised of the phys-
ics concerned with concretes and the physics
concerned with abstracts. Bacon says that the
first examines "substances, and all the vari-
ety of their accidents," while the second deals
with "accidents through all the variety of sub-
stances." 21 He explains that an inquiry into a
lion or an oak supports many different acci-
dents, while an inquiry into heat or gravity
will be found in different substances.
In this study, I focus on the physics of
the concretes, because of its impact on the
field of astronomy, which uses mathematics
to confirm its version of reality. Bacon ques-
tions the validity of inquiries into the physi-
cal causes of the heavenly substances, be-
cause of scientists' reliance on mathematics
to explain the events. As he says,
[plains have been chiefly bestowed in
mathematical observations and demon-
strations: which indeed may show how
to account for all these things inge-
niously, but not how they actually are in
nature: how to represent the apparent
motions of the heavenly bodies, and
machines of them, made according to
particular fancies: but not the real causes
and truth of things. 22
He goes on to say that astronomy has
taken its place among the noblest of the phys-
ics, because of its reliance on mathematics.
Joseph Devey, editor of a 1901 edition of
Bacon's Advancement ofLearn-
Iing,
explains that even "the most
acute minds are no more privi-
leged than the weakest to decide
questions in relation to things of
which they are perfectly igno-
rant." a Bacon, indeed, desired
science to reach beyond strict
empiricism but failed to admit, at
times, that mathematics was (and
is) viewed as the vehicle to this
goal. Devey contends that only
through the use of mathematical
forms did astronomy so quickly
transform itself into the "highest
of the deductive sciences." 24
Bacon embraces mathematics as the
third part of natural philosophy, after phys-
ics and metaphysics. In fact, he argues that
mathematics is an "appendage or auxiliary"
to both the speculative and practical sci-
ences.
25 He goes on to divide mathematics
into what is pure and what is mixed. Pure
mathematics is concerned with the "sciences
employed about quantity, wholly abstracted
from matter and physical axioms." 26 This
form of mathematics is comprised of geom-
etry and arithmetic. The "mixed" sort of
mathematics helps with a better understand-
ing of the parts of physics, for, as Bacon
contends, "without the help of mathematics
many parts of nature could neither be suffi-
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ciently comprehended, clearly demonstrated,
nor dexterously fitted for use." 27
Why did Bacon consider mathematics
so vital to the two other branches of natural
philosophy? He says that since mathemat-
ics is concerned with quantity and "quantity
is the most abstracted and separable from
matter... for this reason it has been more
carefully cultivated and examined into by
mankind than any other forms,..." 28 Be-
cause mathematics is so easily learned, it has
been (and continues to be) used to expand
particular principles and axioms into gen-
eral theories and laws. As mentioned ear-
lier, astronomy's use of mathematical prin-
ciples made it the noblest of the sciences.
Metaphysics is the speculative branch
of natural philosophy. While physics regards
the things that are of matter and in motion,
metaphysics deals with those things ab-
stracted and fixed. So for Bacon, metaphys-
ics is the inquiry into formal and final causes.
In the search for formal causes, he writes:
[a]n opinion has prevailed, as if the
essential forms, or real differences of
things, were absolutely undiscoverahle
by human means; granting this, ...of all
the parts of knowledge, would be the
most worthy of inquiry. 24
Bacon argues that this search often leads into
theological speculations and, thus, threatens
to pollute natural philosophy. So, Bacon
claims that metaphysics is defective, because
its methods create forms that will never ap-
pear/ He says that if scholars will "with
diligence, seriousness, and sincerity... turn
[their] eyes to action and use, [they] may
find, and become acquainted with those
forms, the knowledge whereof will wonder-
fully enrich and prosper human affairs." 31
In other words, metaphysics develops
knowledge that has no practical use.
However, Bacon does not believe that
the search for formal causes is worthless. He
says that it offers two positive values. First,
it collects all of the axioms of science and
tries to unite them into more general notions
that can be used by all individuals. The sec-
ond value of formal metaphysics is that it
imputes to the one who gains knowledge of
formal causes the ability to "superinduce"
nature into all kinds of matter. 33 In other
words. Bacon says that those who learn
nature's forms will have less trouble operat-
ing on nature.
As for the inquiry into final causes,
Bacon says that it has perhaps been mis-
placed in the realm of metaphysics, because
they are primarily being sought out by phys-
ics. He argues that the handling of final
causes has, in fact, driven out the inquiry
into physical causes, replacing them with
those that are "specious and shadowy." 34
The fall of metaphysics
For Aquinas, then, science is the gen-
eral knowledge of things, learned through
their causes. However, this is not the same
way in which modern natural science per-
ceives the physical world. Aquinas' science
does not describe the reality of the world
through mathematical formulas, but ob-
serves phenomena and relates them intelli-
gibly to their causes. In other words,
Aquinas seeks to understand scientific truths
using philosophy, rather than mathematics.
He says that his search, therefore.
...does not simply aim at empirological
knowledge gained through controlled
observation and measurement of the
physical world, but rather at knowledge
of the very being and essential structure
of things. [My] goal is ontological
rather than empirological knowledge. 35
A revolution during the Middle Ages
forever altered the way in which the world
views the sciences. This revolution rejected
not only an inferior form of physics, Maurer
says, but also the philosophy medieval sci-
ence was built upon. 3 * The rejection of the
ontological approach led to the advent of
positivism, which became accepted as the
only valid method of knowing. Science from
this time forward was based strictly on em-
pirical data interpreted by mathematics.
Maurer argues, however, that this change of
focus did not come without a significant cost.
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For if the methods of empirological
science are successful in dealing with
many problems about the physical
universe, they are equally unsuccessful
in handling with many others, and
indeed these the most important of all,
such as the intelligibility of the universe,
the nature of man, his ultimate origin
and destiny, good and evil, and God. 37
Baconian thought, then, led the mod-
em movement, claiming that science's goal
is no longer ontological, but pragmatic.
Pragmatism is exercised by manipulating
nature to create various pieces of technol-
ogy. In other words, the modern movement
in science now urged abandonment of the
pursuit of those things "most worthy of in-
quiry," in order to develop products that can
be used by humanity. Bacon altered the
medieval goal of science by reconstruct-
ing its concept of metaphysics. Whereas
Aquinas' metaphysics dealt with what tran-
scends nature, Bacon's metaphysics re-
mained within the confines of the physical
world, concerned with uniting axioms into
universal laws and gaining knowledge of
nature, in order to "form her upon the an-
vil." This metaphysics, however, is not
willing to discuss anything that is truly be-
yond physics.
This alteration in metaphysics, though,
denies the defining characteristic of a hu-
man being, according to John Paul II, as "the
one who seeks the truth." 38 Moreover, the
Pope argues, "The thirst for truth is so rooted
in the human heart that to be obliged to ig-
nore it would cast our existence into jeop-
ardy." 39 Thus, he says that philosophy (here,
metaphysics) was developed by humanity
to help answer those questions that cannot
be confirmed by experimentation.40 Mod-
ern natural science, though, impedes
humanity's search for truth, by insisting that
truth is apprehended only through its scien-
tific methods. Therefore, modern natural
science monopolizes the determination of
what is truth.
John Paul II cautions that scientist!!,
modern natural science's tendency to ex-
tend physics into metaphysics, not only as-
serts that it has the exclusive means to per-
ceiving reality, but also "relegates reli-
gious, theological, ethical and aesthetic
knowledge to the realm of mere fantasy." 41
Thus, any questions regarding the mean-
ing of life are left to the imagination and
are considered subjects unfit for rational
discourse. The Pope says that such ulti-
mate questions cannot be ignored, because
to do so leads "to the impoverishment of
human thought." 42
Consequently, a new generation of
physicists has decided not to forsake their
humanity, and to pursue answers to life's
ultimate questions. Today's theoretical
physicists ponder the metaphysical aspects
of reality, but under the guise of cosmol-
ogy and other purely scientific fields re-
lated to the study of the universe's origin.
So, can it really be said that theoretical
physics is concerned only with the mea-
surable physical world? Richard Morris
says,
[t]he boundaries between physics and
metaphysics have become blurred.
Questions that would have been
considered metaphysical in another age
enter into discussions of the origin of the
universe.... Meanwhile, some all-
embracing theories are proposed that
yield unverifiable conclusions and
appear similar to the metaphysical
systems constantly propose by nine-
teenth century philosophers. 41
Thus, it appears that modem theoretical
physicists inject metaphysical insights into
their research of cosmic origin, while insist-
ing, all the while, that they are only consid-
ering aspects of physical reality.
Both Aquinas and Bacon include in
their analyses of science a field of study that
uses mathematics and physics together to
consider aspects of the physical world. It
might, then, be said that modern natural sci-
ence (unbeknownst to itself) uses a scien-
tific method that is the illegitimate child of
Aquinas' category of "intermediate science"
and Bacon's category of "mixed mathemat-
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ics." While both categories use mathemat-
ics to understand the realities of the physi-
cal world, each man's understanding of the
sciences is very different from the other's,
and this metaphor must be taken only as
suggestive. Bacon defends the usage of
mathematics in the sciences because it is
easily learned and is notably useful in ex-
tending particular principles into general
theories of physical reality; nevertheless,
John Paul II says it must be understood
that scientism, modern natural science's
tendency to extend physics into meta-
physics, not only asserts that it has the
exclusive means to perceiving reality,
but also "relegates religious, theologi-
cal, ethical and aesthetic knowledge to
the realm of mere fantasy "
Aquinas argues that reality is not found
through mathematics. Modern natural sci-
ence has adopted Baconian thought and,
thus, argues that mathematical interpreta-
tions of nature represent physical reality.
Therefore, modern natural science asserts
that its account of reality is supreme, on
account of its use of physico-mathematical
science.
Jacques Maritain, however, says that it
must be understood that physico-mathemati-
cal science is not "formally" a physical sci-
ence, because it does not grasp the ontologi-
cal nature of the physical realities it deals
with. 44
[Its] sole aim is to co-ordinate the
physical laws that are made known to us
by experiment, but which we could not
even express without the aid of
mathematics.45
In other words, physical reality cannot be
comprehended without mathematical help.
Thus, Maritain says,
[a] physico-mathematical theory will be
called "true" when a coherent and fullest
possible system of mathematical
symbols and the explanatory entities it
organizes coincides, throughout all its
numerical conclusions, with measure-
ments we have made upon the real; but
it is in no wise necessary that any
physical reality, any particular nature, or
ontological law in the world of bodies,
correspond determinately to each of the
symbols and mathematical entities in
question.4 '1
Eddington asserts that
modern natural science
cannot grasp "very defi-
nite conceptions of the
objects of the external
world," until it replaces
their forms "with quanti-
ties representing the re-
sults of physical measure-
ments." 47 It seeks to re-
late these measurements in
a mathematical manner.
Any conclusions that
modern natural science
reaches, or any truths it
claims to attain, however, are valid only
because of the mathematical functions sci-
ence pushes the numbers through: there-
fore, they do not directly correspond to any
physical reality or nature. Modern natu-
ral science, though, since the acceptance
of Baconian thought, believes that its
mathematical explanations of nature di-
rectly represent physical reality.
While the knowledge of the physical
world may be based on measurements,
these numerical values rest "on an obscure
foundation that is outside the realm of
physics...." 48 However, modem natural
science does not acknowledge this and,
thus, allows mathematics to determine its
version of reality. Ever since the medi-
eval understanding of metaphysics was
deleted from the sciences, modern natural
science has insisted, unabated, that it main-
tains the only concept of reality and the
only method to perceive it. As Maritain
argues, though, metaphysical discipline
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must be exercised to prevent physico-math-
ematical science from the
...harmful illusion that leads it to regard
itself as a philosophy of nature and to
believe that things begin to exist only
when they are measured by our
instruments.49
Hence, the vital role of medieval metaphys-
ics must be recognized in the division of the
sciences, because it gives a perspective of
reality not contingent upon the empiricism
of the scientific method. More importantly,
metaphysics allows the pursuit of answers
to those questions that be approached by em-
piricism, e.g., What is the meaning of life?
According to Aquinas, natural science
studies material things, but with the under-
standing that their substantial essences can-
not be known. 3" The knowledge gained of
natural things, therefore, comes "through their
accidental characteristics—their quantity,
qualities, operations, etc.—which are signs of
their essential properties." 51 In other words,
one learns about natural things through their
sensible appearances. Modern natural sci-
ence, though, no longer abides by this medi-
eval understanding. Today's scientists have
replaced a search for essence with a search
for description. The
search for the essence
or quiddity of a thing
was abandoned, be-
cause satisfaction was
found in the application
of characteristics to a
thing, instead. With
Aquinas, one admits
that one does not know
i
what an electron is, be-
cause its essential substance is not known; one
can only seek to describe it, using its physical
characteristics. Modern natural scientists have
adopted the description of an electron, deter-
mined through the use of various methods of
instrumentation, as the essential being of the
electron: an electron is a measurement of en-
ergy or a direction of spin, etc. This, though,
gives no further understanding of what an elec-
tron is, because a description is only the best
metaphor language can give. It is not an in-
sight into the quiddity of an electron.
Where to gofrom here?
For Bacon, "all knowledge proceeds
from a twofold source—either from divine
inspiration or external sense." 52 Scientific
knowledge is derived from nature and rea-
son, whereas divinity is apprehended only
through faith and revelation. This strict sepa-
ration of science from divinity is known as
the "Baconian compromise." Through his
subsequent thought, in Advancement of
Learning, this separation became further dis-
tinct through his formation of two books: the
book of God's word, the Bible; and the book
of God's works, nature or the physical world.
James Moore describes the resulting sepa-
ration this way:
...a political compromise offering
illustrations of the divine omnipotence,
the true sense of the scriptures, and
recovery from the noetic effects of the
Fall in exchange for the freedom of the
students of nature from harassment by
interpreters of biblical texts. 53
The Baconian compromise allowed the young,
budding field of modern natural science to be-
Today's scientists have replaced a search
for essence with a search for description.
The search for the essence or quiddity ofa
thing was abandoned, because satisfaction
wasfound in the application of character-
istics to a thing, instead.
gin the examination of nature, unimpeded by
any possible contradictions present within the
theological discipline. This compromise, sub-
sequently, provided a means for rationalists
to separate themselves from people of faith.
Those who use reason to conceptualize real-
ity argue that they no longer need to be hin-
dered by the subjectivity found in faith's per-
sonal experience. But as John Paul II says,
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Reason and faith cannot be separated
without diminishing the capacity of men
and women to know themselves, the
world and God in an appropriate way. 54
This separation can be easily seen today,
played out in the current lack of dialogue
between scientists and theologians. Scien-
tists contend the true perception of reality
can only be through the objective scientific
method; whereas, theologians assert that life
has meaning beyond the realm of measure-
ment. It should be realized that reason, de-
prived of faith and metaphysical consider-
ations, takes "side-tracks which expose it to
the danger of losing sight of its final goal." 5
Simultaneously, faith or metaphysics with-
out reason stresses "feeling and experience,
and so run the risk of no longer being a uni-
versal proposition." 5fi A rediscovery of the
pre-Baconian method is called for, the
method that benefited from a reason/faith
partnership, because "faith and reason. . .each
without the other is impoverished and en-
feebled." 57
The reality offered by modem natural
science's physico-mathematics must be un-
derstood to be limited to the physical world.
This recognition means that the questions
asked and the answers given by scientists
are properly confined to this physical world.
Hence, theoretical physicists and other
speculative scientists do not have the right
to speculate about anything that leads to a
metaphysical conclusion. Today's scientists
must also realize that the results of physico-
mathematical science are not the totality of
reality. Instead, physico-mathematics is a
system of symbols that helps relate the mea-
surements of nature coherently. And what
happens in the study of a system that does
not yield to physico-mathematical conclu-
sions? Does modem natural science's con-
cept of reality crumble? Thus, modem natu-
ral science's insistence that the physico-
mathematical version of the physical world
is reality appears ridiculous.
Finally, the fact needs to be appreciated
that modern natural science no longer seeks
to determine the essence of what it studies.
It has long been completely satisfied with a
description of an object rather than a deter-
mination of what it really is. For these rea-
sons alone, modem natural science has no
right to monopolize what truth or reality is
and, furthermore, no right to discuss the
metaphysical implications of the being or es-
sence of something it does not truly know
or even seek to know.
Metaphysics needs to be returned to its
medieval role as "queen of the sciences."
Since metaphysics deals with what is "be-
yond physics"—and consequently modern
natural science— it should regulate the sci-
ences to positions below it. A structure that
maintains modern natural science as subor-
dinate to metaphysics is not something to
be feared or (more importantly) scoffed at
by today's scientists. Modem natural scien-
tists need to understand once again the im-
portance of a metaphysical discipline that
deals with what is beyond the contingency
of measurement, because to deal with meta-
physical ramifications within physical argu-
ments, scientists imply that modem natural
science is something it is not—namely, meta-
physics.
Is it necessary, then, to choose between
the reality offered by modem natural science
and the reality of metaphysics? No, but a
way must be discovered successfully to
house then' two concepts of reality under one
system. This system is found within the
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Maritain
contends Thomistic philosophy is the most
appropriate in giving the metaphysical
framework within which physico-math-
ematical science can function. 58 He says that
Thomistic philosophy is valuable, because
it is "essentially realistic and gives a critical
justification for the extramental reality of
things and the value of our powers of know-
ing, which every science takes for
granted...."
51
' This philosophy is important
also because it does not impinge on the au-
tonomy of each science's method of finding
truth/'" Returning an ontological approach
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to modem natural science would also restore
science's original goal—solving the myster-
ies of God's creation. As John Paul II says,
the search tor truth, even when it
concerns a finite reality of the world or
of man, is never-ending, but always
points beyond to something higher than
the immediate object of study, to the
questions which give access to Mys-
tery.
61
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